What is Beginning to Exist: A Critique of the Kalam Cosmological Argument
"1) Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
2) The universe began to exist.
3) Therefore, the universe has a cause."
Craig, William Lane. Reasonable Faith (3rd edition) (p. 111). Crossway. Kindle Edition.
I will from here on out be referring to line 1 as "Premise 1", line 2 as "Premise 2", and line 3 as "Conclusion". I will be quoting more than just the formal argument going forward however. I intend to use quotes from interviews with Craig, his books and any other places that may help make my criticism more clear.
I am not going to address his arguments for what properties we would have to attribute to such a cause- which is essentially his argument for a traditional omni-god because I think his argument fails prior to this point. I do have issues with his later arguments to describe an omni-god, things like how could an immaterial and spaceless mind interact with the material? How could we assume that it can when all immaterial things that we believe to exist now (transcendental things like math and reason) do not interact with the outside world- though their concepts give us the ability to predict physical phenomena. Or perhaps how could an immaterial mind exist at all since all minds we know of are tied to material objects (such as bodies). But I digress- my critique here is one that I think justifies dismissing the argument before we have to take on any of the other issues I may have so I'll try to remain focused on that.
Since the majority of my critique on this subject will come from the definition of "beginning to exist" I'm going to go straight ahead and quote what William Lane Craig has to say on the matter and then begin my deconstruction of this argument. So what does Craig have to say about this? In his discussion with Alex O'Connor from earlier this year that you can find on YouTube, at 45:36 he says.
"X begins to exist at T if X exists at T and T is the first time at which X exists."
Craig, William Lane. William Lane Craig and CosmicSkeptic Discuss The Kalam Cosmological Argument. 45:35-45
If we look at this- and we apply it to the universe, this seems to work just fine. If the universe exists at T (the "big bang" or some such thing) and this is the first time the universe exists, this would be the moment at which it began to exist. I have no issue with that initially- however as Alex O'Connor points out in this discussion- the idea of the existence of composite objects, is a bit more arbitrary. Before we get more into that- and we will- let's start by discussing our understanding of composite vs simple objects and what that means for the KCA.
First let's acknowledge that our understanding of physics has changed dramatically since this argument was constructed. We now realize that the beginning of existence that we think we witness on a regular basis is not the creation of new material ex nihilo. Rather it is the reconstruction of existing objects. We will briefly go into what this means before I explain why I think it's important.
First let's discuss what I will call "composite objects" and "simple objects." A composite object in this case is any object that is composed of two or more parts that can be broken down. The foundation of each physical object is elementary particles that I will call simple objects. We can have, for instance, a physical composite object, such as a chair, which is made up of a series of different composite objects- like the seat, the back, the legs, etc. All of these are composites because they are still made up of many more simple objects. A chair, for nearly all practical purposes is discussed as a singular object. However, when examined more closely we can deconstruct the chair. We can break the chair down to it's materials. Let's say it's made up of steel and wood. Perhaps the legs are steel but the seat and back are wood. We can break that down further, what kind of wood is it? What is it stained with? What is the composition of the steel exactly? We can take this down to it's most fundamental physical parts- that being simple objects.
The most fundamental physical parts in science are referred to as elementary particles. I'm not a particle physicist so I'm not going to pretend to know what these elementary particles are or how they work. It seems to me- that an actual infinite division is impossible- see paradoxes such as the grim reaper paradox or Hilbert's hotel. Such thought experiments seem adequate for me to say that all objects are not infinitely divisible- and because I don't think this is a particularly contentious view, I won't waste any time in defending it. Therefore there must be at least one type of particle, perhaps even several kinds of elementary particles, that make up each and every physical object. I believe the current understanding of particle physics claims there are several elementary particles, and their "anti-particles", that make up all matter and energy in the universe. I don't want to tie the concept of simple objects too closely to these particles specifically for a two reasons. First, I of course am not a particle physicist, nor am I trying to be. Secondly I recognize that this is still a part of theoretical physics and therefore may change at some point in the future and I don't think this conversation is contingent on the specifics of the elementary particles, but rather on the abstract idea of elementary particles. All that I think is necessary to accept at this point is that, as far as we can tell, objects are not infinitely divisible, but that all composite objects are divisible to some finite point- this point I call simple objects.
There is one thing that we can, for certain, postulate about simple objects, however. In order for them to be simple, they must be the most fundamental layer of the physical reality of any given object. If they are composed of other objects or particles, then they certainly can't be simple in the way I'm defining it. We also may point out that each of these simple objects have some properties that make them what they are- but that these properties are not objects in themselves. At this point, we will borrow from particle physics- simply to discuss the beginning and ending of these simple objects. In particle physics it is believed that these elementary particles do change. For instnace, when and upquark and an anti-upquark meet you get a reaction that results in two particles with different properties. In this way- I would describe it not as the beginning or ending of any object, but rather the changing of that objects properties. In this case we have a simple object changing it's properties due to some interaction with another object (often a simple object). We don't have a perfect understanding of particle physics and there is a lot we don't know- so I'll try to divulge from this topic for now- suffice it to say all evidence leads to the idea that these particles aren't really being annihilated and the resulting particles aren't being created ex-nihilo, but rather the particle is changing properties such that it warrants a new description.
In the same way, we don't see composite objects "beginning to exist" ex nihilo. We see a very similar process to the change in simple objects. Let's go back to the example of a chair. In this case we may say that a chair is an object that contains a seat with at least two legs with which the seat is held up. When we cut down the tree, treat the wood, and fashion it into a chair, the chair “begins to exist” in the same way as a simple object- the properties are changed in a way that fullfils the definition of what we call a new object. We change our descriptor of the composite object because it met a new definition, not because the previous object was annihlated and a new one popped into existence.
This seems to be the case for all things that we see "begin to exist". In this way what we are really seeing is the properties of any given object being changed so that we use a different descriptor. For me, this is an important distinction to make, between beginning to exist ex nihilo and beginning to exist by definition. When something begins to exist by way of sufficient changes to it’s properties that it fulfills a new definition, the net energy in the universe doesn’t change- the simple objects are still existent- even if they have changed properties. In this way we have what we should consider a new composite object. Bearing witness to this- noting that a cause is required for any composite or simple object to change properties- we still do not have a valid justification to suppose the manner in which things come to exist ex nihilo. The only honest assumption one can make, based on these experiences is that any prime mover or first cause must have worked with existing material to make up the physical world- as that is all we ever see actually taking place in the universe we observe.
At this point it is necessary to point out that the state of "nothing" that we often talk about as being prior to our universe doesn't have, itself, any properties- so it isn't sufficient to say that a prime mover could have changed the properties of nothing into something and refer to this "nothing" as a "something" that could be changed. The concept of nothing doesn't entail any properties, to attribute any properties to it would be to violate it's definition. For this reason, we can rightfully say that- based purely on our intuite from our experience of our world is that anything that caused the universe must have used pre-existing material and that "changing the properties of nothing" to become "the universe" is not a sufficient explanation.
Before we get to far ahead of ourselves in this- let’s make sure that we are adequately understanding premise 1- that beginning to exist means to come into being from the rearrangement of existing matter or energy. In defense of premise 1 we have Craig saying the following;
"Premise (1) seems obviously true—at the least, more so than its negation. First and foremost, it’s rooted in the metaphysical intuition that something cannot come into being from nothing. To suggest that things could just pop into being uncaused out of nothing is to quit doing serious metaphysics and to resort to magic. Second, if things really could come into being uncaused out of nothing, then it becomes inexplicable why just anything and everything do not come into existence uncaused from nothing. Finally, the first premise is constantly confirmed in our experience. Atheists who are scientific naturalists thus have the strongest of motivations to accept it."
Craig, William Lane. Reasonable Faith (3rd edition) (pp. 111-112). Crossway. Kindle Edition.
It is the last two lines of this excerpt that really shows the issue with Craig's reasoning in the defense of this argument. He claims that the first premise is backed by our experience, which I agree with- if when the first premise says, "begins to exist" it means "composite or simple objects having a change in properties sufficient to warrant a new description". However- Craig, in his talk with Alex O'Connor claims that "begins to exist" refers to a time when something exists and this thing exists for the first time which is not entirely easy to parse when it comes to our experience and Alex even brings up this very point. For instance, at what point does a chair "begin to exist" on this definition? When does a house go from being a hole in the ground to being a house? Surely we can say at some point it is a house, at some point it is a chair, but at what point, we may not know. This is of course called Sorites paradox- but the nature of the paradox isn't the actual issue at hand here- the nature of what "begins to exist" is the issue here. We aren't experiencing the existence of new matter or energy but rather we are experiencing the rearrangement of existing matter and energy into "new" objects by way of sufficiently fulfilling the definition of the new composite or simple object. For me, this presents a fundamental issue with his definition of existence. He seems to think that something that begins to exist (ex nihilo) and something that sufficiently fulfills a definition by way of rearranging current objects is the same type of "beginning to exist". For me these are two distinctly different metaphysical phenomena.
From this, though- it is necessary to notice that anyone doing "serious metaphysics" would recognize the essential difference between the creation of new objects from existing objects and the creation of new objects ex nihilo. If Craig defends the beginning of something with our experience and our intuition on the matter, then we have only done the work to justify believing that all composite objects are the rearranging of other objects. We don't have the requisite justification for anything being created ex-nihilo. Either his justification fails- or when he says begins to exist in the premises, he is applying it to two distinctly different metaphysical phenomena.
If we go ahead anyway and follow the arguments presented to us in this defense, then it stands to reason that the first cause would have to use existing material to create the universe- but this can't be the case because the whole purpose of this argument is that there was a time when the universe didn't exist. In order for the universe to "not exist" then all space, matter and time would have to be nonexistent and therefore there would be nothing to rearrange into the universe. In Craig's defense of some of the properties of the first cause, he gives us an idea of what he means by the "universe".
"Hence, the uncaused First Cause must transcend both time and space and be the cause of their origination. Such a being must be, moreover, enormously powerful, since it brought the entirety of physical reality, including all matter and energy and space-time itself, into being without any material cause."
Craig, William Lane and Moreland, J. P. The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (Page 205).
In this text, we see Craig giving us what the "pre-universe" state he is talking about is- that being a place before the "entirety of physcial reality, including all matter and energy and space-time itself". This validates my belief that, at least in premise 2, he is referring to beginning to exist ex-nihilo. I will use this as the basis for all assumptions I explore on the pre-universe state going forward.
If the "pre-universe" state is as described, we lose any way to reason about it because all of our capacity for reason comes from our observations of our universe. All of our intutions and experience are based on the universe that exists and it's properties. If we have a state devoid of our universe, we have no resaon to continue believing that it is bound by the properties we find at work in our universe. It is to say that without an appeal to the way matter or energy interact over time, we throw out any way we could possibly discuss causality- for causality seems contingent on our understanding of these things- even if quantum physics throws out the nature of causality being intertwined with time, we still have it being contingent on the matter or energy we experience. If there is none, there is no reason to assume the ideas of cause and effect hold. This is not to say that there is no need for a cause- but it is to say that we have no justification in declaring a need for one if there exists no matter or energy to change.
As we explored earlier, matter and energy do change- we referred to them as composite and simple objects. We of course recognzie that in order to have any change in these objects we need a cause. In order for the properties of an object to change, something must act on it to change it- however if we are devoid of objects to change- we are no longer bound to this concept. For it is the nature of the objects themselves that demand a cause. One may say that it is not the nature of the objects themselves that demand cause, but rather a demand from the nature of the universe more wholly- this is completely inline with my current reasoning- that we can't demand a cause for an event that isn't changing the properties of an object. There is no change event- as we mentioned earlier- going from "nothing" to "something" isn't changing the properties of "nothing" because there are no properties. Therefore we have no justification for demanding cause in an instance where we aren't changing the properties of an object- and more so when there is no universe or object to demand such a cause.
My reason for mentioning all of this is to point out the improper generalization of premise 1 and premise 2. In premise 1 it seems reasonable to believe that Craig uses the phrase, "begins to exist" to mean (as I already stated) the metaphysical phenomena of "a composite or simple object having a change in properties sufficient to warrant a new description" because this is the only defninition that fits his justification. The terms of existence are being incorrectly applied to the next premise. In premise 2 we can't use the same definition of "begins to exist" because the phenomena we are describing, namely beginning ex nihilo, is fundamentally different from our previous premise. Even if we invoke Craig's definition of beginning that was mentioned at the outset of this essay, we have to acknowledge that this definition is conflating two distinct metaphsical phenomena and that doing so gives us a false impression of the soundness of his argument. The definition I posit for existence of "new objects" in our universe as already stated is sufficient for all things that "begin to exist" in our universe but is not sufficient for things that "begin to exist" ex nihilo. For this reason, I think it accurate to dismiss Craig's version of the Kalam Cosmological Argument for conflating the two distinct phenomena.
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